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WHY IT IS GOOD TO STOP AT A RED LIGHT:
THE BASIS OF AUTHORITY AND
OBLIGATION
BRIAN MCCALL†
“Law, if it is law, is authoritative, and the authoritative is voice,
voice heard.”1

Throughout history, some have questioned whether the
authority exercised by some over others is consistent with human
nature.2 Is it possible for a law made by one human being to bind
the conscience of another, or is such a claim merely tyranny?3 If
such a power to bind to laws made by humans is justified, what is
its scope? The answers to these related questions explored in
this Article are both descriptive and normative. This Article
explains the nature of authority and the extent of the obligation
to obey the law as well as explains how the architecture of
natural law jurisprudence explains and justifies both the
authority and the obligation. To introduce the subject, this
Article begins by offering a preliminary definition of authority
and obligation. Part I then surveys some of the competing
theories of authority and obligation and demonstrates their lack
of an ontology and a satisfying justification. Part II presents the
classical justification for legal authority and obligation.
Before commencing the discussion, the parameters of the
questions can be narrowed somewhat by defining the terms
authority and obligation. Auctoritas, from which the English
word authority is derived, is a “liberty, ability, [or] power” to
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Joseph Vining, Law’s Own Ontology: A Comment on Law’s Quandary, 55
CATH. U. L. REV. 695, 695 (2006).
2
See 2 FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, SELECTIONS FROM THREE WORKS 363 (Gwladys L.
Williams et al. trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1944).
3
Id.
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express one’s will as a “command, precept, [or] decree.”4 Yet,
such a general definition would encompass the power or ability of
thugs to order people to hand over their wallets. Distinguishing
authority from threats backed by force was one of the primary
concerns of H.L.A. Hart in defining the concept of law.5 As
Joseph Raz observed, justifying authority involves distinguishing
authority to direct action from the mere power to direct action.6
At the very basic level of a definition, it is apparent how the
descriptive answer to the question of legal authority is
inextricably linked to the normative claim.
That which
distinguishes authority from threats backed by force, or
authoritarian, is legitimacy. The power or ability to command is
a legitimate or justified power, an attribute lacking in the case of
the gunman. Authority involves both an ability to impose one’s
choice of a law upon others as well as a normative justification
for doing so.7 Yet, to constitute legitimate authority, not only
must one have the power to command, but that power must also
include a duty to obey on the part of the one commanded.8
Obedience to the law involves conforming one’s actions to the
requirements of the law.9 Legitimate authority entails an
obligation to conform one’s action to the command in a way that
the threat of the gunman does not. The effect may be the same—
the completion of an action complying with the instructions of
another—but the nature of that conformity is different. In the
case of the gunman, conformity may be necessary to avoid harm,
but it is not normatively obligatory. It is not an act of obedience
to conform to the gunman even if it becomes prudentially
expedient. In contrast, the claim of authority involves more than

4
Auctoritas, CHARLTON T. LEWIS & CHARLES SHORT, A LATIN DICTIONARY
(Oxford Univ. Press 1879).
5
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 7, 20 (3d ed. 1961).
6
Joseph Raz, AUTHORITY AND JUSTIFICATION, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 5 (1985).
7
C.G. Bateman, Sovereignty’s Missing Moral Imperative, 8.2 INT’L ZEITSCHRIFT
30, 40 (2012) (“[S]overeignty denotes two main tenets which support its legitimacy.
First, there must be a political body or person with the capacity to exercise power
over a specific community and place such that no higher authority exists within its
jurisdiction. Second, sovereignty must insist that a positive moral imperative is
placed on the person or body executing such power in practice.”).
8
See Raz, supra note 6 (noting that those claiming legitimate authority are
correct “only if and to the extent that their claim is justified and they are owed a
duty of obedience”).
9
See id. at 7 (“I do all that the law requires of me if my actions comply with
it.”).
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a threat of harm making conformity expedient; although a threat
may be added to the instruction of law to encourage obedience.10
It is not the threat that makes the law obligatory. The threat is
legitimate if and only if the one giving the instruction is
possessed of authority in contrast to mere force. As Randy
Barnett explains, “A lawmaking system is legitimate . . . if it
creates commands that citizens have a moral duty to obey.”11
In the pithy words of Joseph Vining, legal authority produces
“willing obedience.”12 Willing obedience is not the same as being
happy or pleased about one’s obedience. It means being willing
to obey even when one does not want to obey. Although Joseph
Raz would dispute a general duty to obey the law,13 he does
understand the concept of authority as a power to give another
an exclusionary reason for acting when one does not understand
the reasons or when one would choose otherwise.14 If not morally
obligatory, for Raz, authoritative law can at least give one a
preemptive reason to act.15
As Philip Soper has noted,
recognizing an authority preempts, in some way, individual
choice, in the sense that a command or precept given by one with
authority takes some degree of freedom away from deliberating
personally about the regulated action.16 Soper describes this
autonomy-limiting role of authority as a “content-independent”
reason for action, meaning that the reason for action is rooted in
the authority of the one commanding or enacting the law and not
in the content of the command or law being correct.17 In other
words, the power referred to in the definition of authority is a
power to require others to act on the authority’s determination of
the correctness of the content of the authoritative claim.
10

See id. at 5.
Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 116
(2003).
12
Vining, supra note 1, at 696.
13
See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 233 (2d ed. Oxford Univ. Press
2009) [hereinafter RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW].
14
JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 62–65 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999)
[hereinafter RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS]; RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW,
supra note 13, at 17–19.
15
RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 35–48, 58–78; Raz,
supra note 6, at 13 (“The fact that an authority requires performance of an action is
a reason for its performance which is not to be added to all other relevant reasons
when assessing what to do, but should exclude and take the place of some of them.”).
16
Phillip Soper, Legal Theory and the Claim of Authority, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
209, 215 (1989).
17
Id. at 217–18.
11
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While Abner Greene argues that this preemption of
individual determination requires justification, Hart and Kelsen,
in contrast, proceed in their jurisprudence without providing a
complete justification for legal authority but merely assume its
presence in the system.18 Kelsen merely assumes the existence of
a basic norm which he calls a “juristic hypothesis.”19 Hart
acknowledges that without some minimal content, no person
would have a reason to obey the law and no legal system would
exist.20 Yet, he merely assumes the existence of this minimum
content as a rational necessity without normatively justifying or
rigorously defining it. This lack of metaphysical justification is
most obvious in his treatment of the Rule of Recognition,21 which
he asserts exists simply because it must exist and thereby
sidesteps any rigorous ontological treatment of this foundational
rule and its causes. Both Kelsen’s basic norm and Hart’s Rule of
Recognition are used to ground their concepts of the legal system.
Yet, the most that either thinker can do is simply posit the
existence of such a lynchpin of authority as a logical necessity.
Hart simply introduces the Rule of Recognition as that rule
which tells you what rules count as rules.22 Hart offers no
explanation for the origin of such a rule of recognition other than
it just exists in every legal system. Ultimately Hart’s analysis
simply ends at an ultimate rule of recognition which has no rule
to evaluate its own validity; it is simply “ ‘assumed’ or
‘postulated’ or is a ‘hypothesis.’ ”23 A rule of recognition can
“neither be valid nor invalid but is simply accepted as
appropriate for use.”24 For Hart and his disciples, the Rule of
Recognition is simply asserted as an uncaused cause of legal
18

ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION 102 (2012).
HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE, at xv (Anders Wedberg
trans., Russell & Russell 1945). The author adopts Joseph Raz’s interpretation of
Kelsen’s theory with respect to the origin of the basic norm. See RAZ, THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 13, at 126.
20
Hart, supra note 5, at 193–94 (“In the absence of [the minimum] content men,
as they are, would have no reason for obeying voluntarily any rules; and without a
minimum of co-operation given voluntarily by those who find that it is in their
interest to submit to and maintain the rules, coercion of others who would not
voluntarily conform would be impossible.”).
21
Id. at 84–85, 92–93.
22
Id. at 94.
23
Id. at 108.
24
Id. at 109; see also RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 13, at 69
(arguing that the ultimate rule in a legal system has no rule to establish its
validity).
19
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systems.
It is merely a fact devoid of any metaphysical
explanation or proof that a certain rule of recognition exists in a
particular legal system.25 The basic norm and the rule of
recognition are simply assumed as givens, and authority is
therefore simply assumed to exist. Even Ronald Dworkin, who is
claimed by some as a proponent of moral reasoning in
jurisprudence,26 simply asserts the justification of coercive
authority. For Dworkin, current adjudications are based on past
political decisions, which are simply assumed into the system
without justification.27
The examination of authority in this Article makes the
stronger claim that legal authority can be justified and not
simply assumed. Yet, even Raz’s minimalist notion of authority
as a mere reason for acting requires some justification. Why
should the adoption of a rule by a political ruler present a
particular reason for choice? Thus, even Raz needs to identify
the ontological and normative grounding of his minimalist legal
authority to give exclusionary reasons. This Article contends
that the architecture onto which human law is layered justifies
legal authority. The authority of human laws can be justified
and explained only in light of the eternal and natural law.
Contra Raz, the concept of authority articulated in this
Article necessarily entails an obligation located beyond the mere
command of the one claiming authority to compel obedience to
the command. The power of authority in its essence is the power
not merely to persuade one to choose an action one might
otherwise not have chosen but, as Perry has defined it, the power
“to change persons’ normative situations,” by which he means
changing their normative situation by creating a specific
obligation to act that did not exist prior to the authoritative act.28
Authority in the strongest sense of the word is not merely a
25

Hart, supra note 5, at 104–05.
See, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, How Constitutional Theory Found Its Soul: The
Contributions of Ronald Dworkin, in EXPLORING LAW’S EMPIRE: THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF RONALD DWORKIN 1, 1 (Scott Hershovitz ed., Oxford Univ. Press
2006).
27
See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 93, 97, 103, 151 (1986); see also Brian
M. McCall, Exploring the Foundations of Dworkin’s Empire: The Discovery of an
Underground Positivist, 4 J.L., PHIL. & CULTURE 195, 201–02 (2009) (reviewing
SCOTT HERSHOVITZ, EXPLORING LAW’S EMPIRE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF RONALD
DWORKIN (2008)).
28
Stephen R. Perry, Political Authority and Political Obligation 2 n.4 (July 12,
2012) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Legal Scholarship Repository).
26
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claimed ability to superior knowledge of what should be done.29
To hold authority involves more than merely repeating the
content of a preexisting obligation for the purpose of clarifying
and publicizing its content—although those possessing authority
may do this as well. The strongest form of the concept of
authority involves a power to legitimately bring obligations into
existence by choosing to enact particular laws. This Article
defines, delineates, and defends this strong form of authority.
Stephen Perry offers a useful definition of this strong form of
authority that is the subject of this Article: “If a directive was
issued by an organ of a government which not only claims but
also possesses legitimate authority, then those persons who fall
within the scope of the directive have an obligation to obey it.
Because legitimate authority is moral authority, this obligation is
a moral obligation.”30 The definition contains a criterion for
distinguishing
between
what
Patrick
Brennan
calls
31
“authoritarian” and “authority.”
The definition of legitimate
authority creates a distinction between a subtle gunman, the one
who clothes himself in the robes of a political ruler claiming
authority but who, although possessing the power to compel
compliance, lacks the power to create obligations to comply.
Whereas most people can recognize the gunman when they see
him, it is more difficult to recognize the gunman when he is
clothed with the vestments of legitimate authority, when he
commands from the Kremlin or the White House, but whose
claim to authority is false. By defining the precise scope of the
claim to authority, it becomes possible to distinguish the
authoritarian from the authority. By claiming the obligation to
be moral, Perry points to a criterion of evaluation outside the
command itself. It obligates by virtue of something beyond itself
whereas the gunman or the authoritarian merely obliges by the
force of his threats.
One final definitional clarification is warranted. This Article
considers only a species of political authority, the power
specifically to create or alter laws. The definition of auctoritas
included the power to create both commands and precepts.32
29

See GREENE, supra note 18.
PERRY, supra note 28, at 5.
31
Patrick McKinley Brennan, Locating Authority, in CIVILIZING AUTHORITY:
SOCIETY, STATE AND CHURCH 163 (Patrick Brennan ed., Lexington Books 2007).
32
See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL THEORY 100 (Mark Bevir ed., 1st ed. 2010).
30
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Political authority in the broadest sense includes both of these
powers.
Political authority includes the power to order
individuals to act in particular ways. The president may order
the army to move to a specific location. The governor may order
the offices of a state to close on a certain day due to inclement
weather. Neither of these acts involves the creation of a law.
Law involves the formulation of a rule and measure of human
acts which, although capable of formulation at various levels of
generality or specificity, are directed to a community, or a group
within a community, to serve as a general guide to action—not
an order to act a particular way at a particular time. A law, as
opposed to a command, transcends any particular individuals.33
Laws, although capable of repeal, are written to apply beyond
any particular individual at any point in time. A formulated law
is not directed merely to the living members of the community for
which it is made but to future members—unless the law is later
revoked. A command, by contrast, is directed to compel action by
one or more particular individuals at points in time and is
intended to lapse when the commanded acts are completed. The
consideration of authority within this Article is restricted solely
to the power to change normative positions by enacting laws.
This limitation is not meant to deny the existence of the power of
authorities to command but merely to distinguish the power
which is likely subject to differing justifications and limitations.
Austin and Hart, two jurists who have thought deeply about
authority and law, seem to neglect this distinction within
political authority.34 The following discussion is concerned solely
with the authority to make obligatory law. Part I examines the
two general categories of arguments used to justify legal
authority and demonstrate how they fail. It concludes with a
brief examination of two theories of authority which do not fall
into either group and which come the closest to a real
justification of legal authority, that of Joseph Raz and Stephen
Perry. Yet, even these attempts fail to provide a completely
satisfactory answer.

33
See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. I-II, Q. 90, art. 4
[hereinafter SUMMA THEOLOGIAE].
34
See, e.g., HART, supra note 5, at 18–48; RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra
note 13, at 11–19.
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ATTEMPTS TO JUSTIFY AUTHORITY AND OBLIGATION

Innumerable attempts have been made in the history of
jurisprudence to justify the power of some people to make laws
which others are obliged to obey and thereby change the others’
normative position. Although there are many fine distinctions
among the theories, they can be grouped into two major
categories: consent theories and utilitarian arguments. This Part
summarizes the key features of each type of justification and
demonstrates their inadequacy, both in the sense of the failure of
the argument on its own terms and its failure to explain the
ontological goodness of authority. If the strong form of the
definition of authority requires that those subject to the law
should obey the law even when they believe their calculation of
the best action is superior, a complete justification of authority
must prove the ontology of authority by explaining its origin and
causes. It must demonstrate the good of authority in itself, and
not merely instrumentally. To assist in this evaluation, this Part
has recourse to the criteria developed by Leslie Green to evaluate
whether a particular purported legal system entails an obligation
to obey its laws. Although these criteria are not formulated to
prove the reality and goodness of authority in the universal
context, they are helpful when applied to particular communities.
Stephen Perry has provided a succinct recitation of Green’s
criteria:
To justify the conclusion that there is, within a given legal
system, a general obligation to obey the law, the supporting
argument or arguments must, according to Green, show that
this obligation is (i) a moral reason for action; (ii) a contentindependent reason for action, meaning a reason to do as the
state directs because the state directs it and not because its
directives have a certain content; (iii) a binding or mandatory
reason for action, as opposed to a reason which simply happens
to outweigh other relevant reasons; (iv) a particular reason for
action, meaning a reason that arises only for the directives of a
citizen’s (or subject’s) own state, and not for the directives of
other states; and, finally, (v) a universal reason for action, in the
double sense that it binds all of a state’s citizens to all of that
state’s laws.35

35

Perry, supra note 28, at 14.
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Throughout the analysis of authority, these six criteria will be
used as a hermeneutic for judging the success or failure of
theories of authority.
A.

Consent Theories

When the natural law-based justification of authority,
described in the next Section, was rejected in the early modern
era, philosophers and jurists not willing to abandon themselves
to anarchism searched for a substitute. They turned to a familiar
area of the law: contracts. Contract law is the law of voluntarily
created obligations. If successful, consent theory would satisfy
the six conditions for authority since it provides a binding
content-independent moral reason for obeying the law made by
others universally applicable only to the members of the relevant
community. The reason for obeying the law would be the
antecedent contractual promise to do so not because of its content
but because one promised to obey the law. The moral obligation
to obey the law would be entailed by the moral obligation to
honor voluntary contracted obligations—which if such a moral
obligation can be proven it would support public contracts
consenting to obey the law. If the consent were valid such an
obligation would be binding. If the consent as given applied
universally to all laws made at any time, the obligation would be
universal and at the same time limited only to those members of
the community made such by consent and not individuals
consenting to different states. Although the six conditions would
be met, the problem is that consent theory has not been able to
establish the existence of the requisite voluntary consent to a
universal obligation to obey the laws of a particular legal system
by each member of the relevant legal community.
Contracts come into existence upon the freely given consent
of the contracting parties. From Rousseau to Locke, many who
rejected traditional natural law saw a potential substitute theory
in this basic act of voluntary consent.36 Legal authority and the
entailed obligation could be the product of voluntary consent of
the governed entering into a compact imposing an obligation to
obey the law.37 But contracts only impose binding obligations on

36
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ¶ 95 (Bobbs-Merrill 1952);
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, SOCIAL CONTRACT 152 (Penguin Books 1968).
37
See, e.g., LOCKE, supra note 36, at ¶¶ 14, 22.
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the parties actually consenting thereto, and consent of the
governed is, at best, a myth. The consent myth has played a
significant role in attempting to justify legal authority in
America. Americans must obey the law because the consent of
“We the People” legitimized the U.S. government.38 America’s
first president invoked this argument to urge obedience to the
laws during his farewell address:
The basis of our political systems is the right of the people to
make
and
to
alter
their
own
constitutions
of
government. . . . The very idea of the power and the right of the
people to establish government presupposes the duty of every
individual to obey the established government.39

Christopher
Ferrara
has
exploded
such
rhetoric
demonstrating that “We the People” was no more than a tiny
minority of the people living in America at the time of ratification
of the Constitution.40 According to Ferrara,
no more than about five percent of the total American
population at the time, or about 160,000 white male voters
actually cast votes for delegates to the ratifying conventions. Of
these 160,000 probably about 60,000 were opposed to
ratification. Thus . . . it was . . . only a few hundred ad hoc
delegates at ratifying conventions whose votes represented the
will of about 100,000 propertied electors in a nation of some 3.5
million people, not including the slave population.41

Beyond this problem, how does this consent of a majority of five
percent of the population hundreds of years ago express the
voluntary consent of those living today? As Randy Barnett
quipped, “In what sense can a small minority of inhabitants
presuming to call themselves ‘We the People’ bind anyone but
themselves? And assuming they could somehow bind everyone
then alive, how could they bind, by their consent, their
posterity?”42 Yet, these few hundred men’s votes, treated by the
myth of “We the People,” are deemed sufficient to express a
voluntary consent to be morally obligated to universally obey the
38

See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 11, at 115.
George Washington, “Farewell Address” (Sept. 17, 1796), in Documents of
American History, 169, 172 (Henry Steele Commager & Milton Cantor eds., 10th ed.,
Prentice-Hall, 1973).
40
CHRISTOPHER A. FERRARA, LIBERTY THE GOD THAT FAILED 175–87 (Angelico
Press 2012).
41
Id. at 183.
42
Barnett, supra note 11, at 123.
39
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laws of a government that was ratified hundreds of years ago.
No one living today was alive then to even be excluded from that
elite electorate
Even Jean-Jacques Rousseau recognized that the only way to
justify legal authority—and an obligation on the part of each
member of a society to obey the law—is through unanimous
consent to this social contract.43 Yet, even this early pioneer of
consent theory recognized his social contract was only a myth
and not a real contract. Unlike with real contracts, which
require a real objective manifestation to be bound by the
contract, Rousseau admitted that requiring real universal
consent was impossible and some form of tacit consent would be
necessary to hold his theory together.44 The weakest form of tacit
consent attempts to imply consent from other acts or passive
states ranging from voting, residing in a territory, the failure to
engage in rebellion,45 or the receipt by a resident of a territory of
some benefit.46 The voting or political participation version of
implied consent relies on the ambiguity of an act like voting
which may not imply consent to the system but merely be an act
of self defense to avoid a worse evil.47 As to passive acts such as
living in a territory or benefiting from living in a society,48 these
43

ROUSSEAU, supra note 36.
Id. at 135, 153.
45
Barnett, supra note 11, at 118.
46
LOCKE, supra note 36, at ¶ 119.
47
See GREENE, supra note 18, at 45. Greene also points out that participation in
the electoral process, even if it could imply consent to the results of the election in
which one voted, cannot be used for its claimed purpose of binding one to the
electoral results in the past. Id. at 47. Jeffrey Reiman summarizes the failure of the
so-called electoral participation theory of consent:
[T]here is nothing inherently legitimating about the electoral process. If
anything, the electoral process is the problem, not the solution. . . . [T]he
policies that emerge from the electoral process will be imposed on the
dissenting minority against its wishes. And then, rather than answering
the question of legitimacy, this will raise the question with respect to those
dissenters. Why are the exercises of power approved by the majority
against the wishes of (and potentially prohibiting the desired actions of) the
minority obligatory with respect to the minority? Why are such exercises of
power not simply a matter of the majority tyrannizing the minority?
Jeffrey Reiman, The Constitution, Rights, and the Conditions of Legitimacy, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSION 127, 134 (Alan S. Rosenbaum
ed., Greenwood Press 1988).
48
See, e.g., A. JOHN SIMMONS, THE PRINCIPLE OF FAIR PLAY, THE DUTY TO OBEY
THE LAW: SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL READINGS 107, 124–5, (Williamson A.
Edmunson ed., Rowman & Littlefield 1999); A. John Simmons, The Principle of Fair
Play, 8 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 307, 307 (1979);
44
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arguments run afoul of the principle that mere silence cannot
bind an offeree to a contract.49 A car company cannot drop off a
car in your driveway and say, “You owe us if we do not hear from
you.” As Randy Barnett observes, “It is still not clear, however,
that one is obligated to pay for all unsolicited benefits one
receives from others.”50 If taken to its logical extension, the
receipt of benefits legitimizes slavery at least in the case of a
beneficent master who provides enough benefits.51
At a
minimum, the resting of a claim to tacit consent on the threat of
removal of basic benefits flowing from communal life of any
society would seem to constitute undue influence or even duress.
Any attempt at implying consent by the receipt of benefits must
prove that an easy and realistic option exists for exiting the
purportedly beneficial system. People are born into a territory,
into a family, and have very little real choice to leave or rebel.
The absence of a realistic, inexpensive exit option from the
territory means that remaining in a territory is a poor argument
for the presence of freely given consent.52 Thus, tacit consent is
really a method for imposing the desired consent on those who do
not affirmatively do so. As Randy Barnett wryly notes, “It is a
queer sort of ‘consent’ where there is no way to refuse. ‘Heads I
win, tails you lose,’ is the way to describe a rigged contest.
‘Heads’ you consent, ‘tails’ you consent, ‘didn’t flip the coin,’ guess
what? You consent as well. This is simply not consent.”53 The
logical fallacy in all consent arguments consists in a faulty leap
from the legitimate principle of consent in personal relationships
and contracts to implied consent in impersonal groups.54 Rawls’s
approach represents a desperate last-ditch effort to invent
consent. If real and tacit consent fail to exist, a “hypothetical
consent” can be implied. People have consented to that to which
they ought to consent. Rawls argues, “The choice which rational

49
Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability: The Case for Using
“Knowing Assent” as the Basis for Analyzing Unbargained-for Terms in Standard
Form Contracts, 31 Seattle U. L. Rev. 469, 502 (2008).
50
Barnett, supra note 11, at 133.
51
Id. at 136.
52
GREENE, supra note 18, at 39–40.
53
Barnett, supra note 11, at 120.
54
See GREENE, supra note 18, at 81 (arguing that such a consent argument “is
constitutive of intimate associations and one-to-one promise relationships,
respecting the state or a state official as one would respect oneself is not constitutive
of citizenship”).
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men would make in this hypothetical situation of equal
liberty . . . determines the principles of justice.”55 Thus, “We the
People” must obey the laws because Americans have
hypothetically consented to what John Rawls says people would
have consented to if he asked them, which in fact he never did.
Consent has turned into hypothetical or imagined consent. Paul
W. Kahn makes explicit the imaginary nature of consent:
To see through the constitution to the popular sovereign whose
act it records is what makes it literally our constitution, despite
the fact that we, as finite individuals, neither wrote it nor
approved it. This is not a matter of “implicit consent” but of a
social imaginary that grounds faith. The constitution claims us
not because it is just—although we want it to be just—but
because it is a remnant of a politics of authenticity that we still
imagine as our own.56

Beyond the failure to actually prove the existence of any real,
meaningful consent to legal authority, the consent argument fails
for another reason of ontology. Even if everyone could somehow
engage in an evergreen free and voluntary consent, what proof is
there that individuals possess the ability to confer such a power
in the first place? It is an ancient legal maxim that no one can
transfer more authority than one possesses.57 The proponents of
consent merely argue about the legitimacy of the process of
passing along legitimate authority from “We the People” to
lawmakers. Yet, as Kelsen argues, legitimate authority must
rest on a chain of authorization back to a source.58 Consent
theory, if successful, merely proves that a power was passed
legitimately. It has no answer for the origin of the power to
change others normative situation. It has no answer to the
question how one or more human beings can change the
normative position of another creature sharing an equal nature.
As Abner Greene observes, consent theory only works if you start
with the premise that individuals possess authority to be given
up in the consenting.59 Whence does the power to choose our own
actions originate? By focusing on the process of transmission,
55

JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999).
PAUL W. KAHN, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR NEW CHAPTERS ON THE
CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 142 (Columbia Univ. Press 2012).
57
See, e.g., Justinian, Digest 50.17.54 (“Nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre
potest, quam ipse haberet.”).
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See RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 13, at 126.
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GREENE, supra note 18, at 36.
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consent theories ignore the larger ontological problem of the
justification of the power supposedly transmitted. Stephen Perry
glimpses this problem with acts of consent justifying the
categorical power to obligate everyone to obey the law.60 Michael
Moore explains that the failure of consent theories—or other
theories based upon the will of individuals—lies in the
unjustified move from the fact that sometimes individuals engage
in obligation-creating acts—by making a promise for example—to
the claim that individuals possess a limitless sovereignty to
create obligations.61 This limitless sovereignty, which consent
theorists assume resides in the individual, can then be
transmitted by some real or fictitious consent. Yet, as Moore
argues:
We should see these obligation-creating acts as part of our
limited moral sovereignty, that is, the capacity which each
person possesses to alter the moral landscape through his
exercise of will. . . . That we have some such sovereignty at all is
only because other obligation-creating norms permit us to have
and to exercise such powers.”62

Even if actual consent were possible, which it is not, it would not
transmit a plenary obligation-creating authority since
individuals lack such limitless authority. Thus, consent theories
of varying stripes fail to fulfill, at the very minimum, Leslie
Green’s first and third criteria.63
Absent real unanimous
consent, the theory does not establish a moral reason to obey the
law as the authority supposedly conferred by consent has no
ontological or moral basis, and consent theories lack a plausible
reason why those who do not consent to the system in general or
particular laws with which they disagree are obligated
notwithstanding their lack of consent universally to obey the law.
60
Perry, supra note 28, at 29 (“But the basic argument, which if correct applies
to all ‘voluntaristic’ arguments for a general obligation to obey the law, including the
argument from fair play, is this. Any argument that offers to justify the state’s
claimed moral power to impose obligations cannot be conditioned on such
contingencies as whether or not citizens (or, more generally, subjects of the law)
have engaged in a particular kind of act—for example, the acceptance of benefits, or
the making of a promise. This is so because any obligations that arise from the
exercise of the power will be categorical, and as such cannot be conditioned on this
kind of contingency.”).
61
Michael S. Moore, Good Without God, in NATURAL LAW, LIBERALISM, AND
MORALITY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 235–36 (Robert George, ed., 2001).
62
Id. at 236.
63
See Perry, supra note 28, at 11–12.
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This lack of reasonable plausibility evacuates human law of
the quality of rationality. For consent theorists such as Thomas
Hobbes, the starting point is not a universally valid rational law
but rather each person’s right to self-preservation.64 Since the
foundation of modern authority is not a rational law, the rule of
the wise in which rulers deserve to make law because they are
skilled in the love of truth, advocated by the ancient
philosophers, is no longer considered the best regime.65 One does
not rule by virtue of wisdom but by virtue of having received
some volitional consent in the mythical state of nature. Law no
longer needs to be reasonable but simply be a willed act of the
hypothetically consented to authority.66
B.

Utilitarian Justifications

Beyond consent theories, another group of jurists attempt to
justify authority on utilitarian grounds. This term does not
mean that all of these theorists are utilitarian in the strict sense
of the term.
They all approach the topic from different
philosophical premises. What they all have in common is that
they justify authority only instrumentally. Authority is good
because it is instrumentally useful or effective for achieving some
other good. Certainly there is nothing wrong with authority
being efficient or useful in achieving other goods. The problem is
that usefulness does not justify authority as a real good. If it is
only instrumentally good, then authority cannot bind universally
in conscience. Doing so begs the question if in a particular
situation obedience to authority is not useful or effective—even
taking such terms in their most long-term perspective where
obedience may not be useful in particular case but disobedience
may diminish respect for law, including for the actor, and thus it
is useful to obey in the one case, why should one obey the law?
One should obey a legal authority in such a case only if doing so
is in and of itself good. To say anything less about authority may
justify authority as useful but does not justify a universal
obligation to obey the law because doing so is good.

64
65
66

LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT IN HISTORY 185–86 (1953).
Id.
Id.
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For the utilitarian justification, the presence of an authority
to make laws that people are obligated to obey is useful for
communities. Society is better off with authority than without.
Although the prior sentence may sound like a truism to all but
the most committed anarchist, it does not really justify authority
in and of itself. It only justifies it as a less offensive alternative
to anarchy. Ultimately, although some utilitarians use moral
language—and would likely object to being labeled utilitarian—
all among the wide variety of utilitarian theories fail to support
an authority that gives a content independent moral reason to
obey the law universally.
The negative utilitarian argument—it is a lesser evil than
anarchy—is rooted in the state of nature myth used by the
consent theorists although it avoids the need for consent. The
state of nature is so dangerous and horrid that indiviuals are all
better off with authority that can keep them from slipping back
into the state of nature.67 One of the two main problems with
this argument is that it is unverifiable. Since it compares life
with authority to a never existent myth, it can never prove its
claim of life being better now. The argument sets up a false
dichotomy between life with authority and a nonexistent reality
so it simply asserts the conclusion that authority is useful.
Secondly, the theory fails criteria (ii) content independence,
criteria (iii) a binding obligation and not merely the best among
other reasons, and criteria (v) universality. Since the end of
authority, for the utilitarian approach, is merely avoiding a
worse fate, its goodness is dependent upon the extent to which it
is in fact the best means to that end in all cases. The problem of
legal cheating confronts the theory. To use a classic example, if a
person can know for certain that driving through a red light at a
deserted intersection entails no risk of slipping into the dreaded
state of nature, and if in fact that person can argue that arriving
at the destination on time will contribute to a stable and orderly
society—perhaps he is on the way to a shift as a police officer—
then that person can conclude that running the light is more
utilitarian. This example sweeps some complexity under the
carpet. There is the argument that not obeying the law wears
down respect for the law, and thus it should be universally
obeyed even when a particular instance suggests it is
67

See GREENE, supra note 18, at 94–95 (summarizing this argument).
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unnecessary in that context. Yet, if it could be proven that an
individual is a perfect utilitarian in that he will not lose his sense
of respect for laws that are really justified on a case-by-case basis
to avoid the slip into the state of nature then he has no duty to
obey a law which does not instrumentally serve the given end.
The negative utilitarian argument thus fails to bind universally
but only when a particular law is in fact an effective means to
avoid the slip into the state of nature. It also fails to offer a
content independent reason for obeying the law. Each law is only
worthy of obedience to the extent its content actually fulfills the
utilitarian criterion of effectiveness.
The more successful utilitarian arguments approach the
problem positively.
The good that authority is useful for
achieving is not simply avoiding a worse mythical state but
making possible some positive good. For John Finnis, authority
is essentially utilitarian in that it makes possible the good of
coordination. First, Finnis argues that authority is needed
because people are selfish and foolish in pursuing the common
good.68 This argument is merely a reformulated version of the
state of nature argument. Without authority, society is at the
mercy of selfish and foolish people. Authority is needed to avoid
this worse fate. But Finnis progresses to a more interesting
question, “In a community free from these vices, would authority
be needed, or justified?”69 Finnis asserts that “more authority”
may be necessary in such an idyllic community to solve
coordination problems.70 Practical reasonableness will often
support several reasonable and appropriate solutions to a
problem. Authority is needed to choose among them since
unanimity of choice is practically impossible and consent theory
is merely a form of unattainable unanimity. Having an authority
Authority is thus only an
is the only other possibility.71
instrumental good “because required for the realization of the
common good.”72
Although less morbid than the negative
utilitarians—since Finnis talks about achieving a positive
common good not merely avoiding a worse evil—in the end Finnis
can only argue that authority is good by default. Nothing else
68
69
70
71
72

JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 231 (2011).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 231–33.
Id. at 246.
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works to coordinate effort towards the common good so authority
must be good. Authority is thus not good in the broadest sense in
which Finnis uses the term—and for which he introduces the
word value.73 To be such, it must be “desirable for its own sake
and not merely as something sought after under some such
description as . . . ‘what will contribute to my survival.’ ”74
Consistently Finnis does not include authority in his list of basic
goods.75 It is only good if it is the only means to achieve
coordination which itself is only an instrumental and not basic
good. If it could be proven that either in a society of devils or of
angels, coordination and the common good could be achieved
without authority, then authority would lose its purpose and
cease to be an instrumental good. Finnis offers no real ontology
for authority as a good in itself. His theory of authority thus fails
criteria (ii), (iii), and (v). The only reason to obey authority is
because it appears to be the only useful means of coordinating
action. Thus, to the extent authority fails to do so it is sapped of
its moral authority and is thus not content independent. As
understood by Finnis, authority lacks universality in that it
would cease to exist in the presence of other more effective
methods of coordination.
Although Finnis ultimately concludes that “God is the basis
of obligation,”76 he denies that knowledge of God helps answer
questions about obligation.77 Finnis clearly states that he does
not ground his understanding of obligation in terms of conformity
to God’s Supreme Will,78 although he admits that God is the
ultimate origin of obligation. As with the Eternal Law, Finnis’
ultimate conclusion is that God is practically irrelevant for
understanding and justifying authority. Such a conclusion runs
counter to the entire Aristotelian tradition which holds that we
must know things through their causes. The ultimate causality
of God for authority is dismissed by Finnis from necessary
consideration.

73
74
75
76
77
78

Id. at 61.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 86–90.
Id. at 407.
Id. at 405.
Id. at 403.
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Stripped of a necessary ontology of its own, Finnis’s theory
contains, for all practical purposes, no origin of authority, no
transmission, devolution, or consent. Tellingly, when Finnis
quotes Fortescue’s famous discussion of authority, he can’t abide
his statement that authority comes from “natural law” and
changes it to “practical reasonableness.”79 If authority comes
from natural law, that suggests it has an ontology, a history of
devolution. The next Part shows that Fortescue’s claim that the
law of nature establishes authority, which Finnis dismisses as
“lawyerly jargon,”80 is central to the ontological justification of
authority. For Finnis, there is only a fact: People acquiescing to
someone as an authority explains that there is authority.81
Lawyers try to legalize the devolution of undevolved authority.82
“[T]he sheer fact that virtually everyone will acquiesce in
somebody’s say-so is the presumptively necessary and defeasibly
sufficient condition for the normative judgment that that person
has—that is, is justified in exercising—authority in that
community.”83 Ironically, although Finnis goes to great lengths
to claim he is avoiding the “is” entails “ought” so-called fallacy—
rather than rejecting its universal application as a fallacy—this
argument simply asserts that authority ought to exist because
people nearly universally do acquiesce to someone. To this
“scandalously stark principle” he adds two riders. First, the
person exercising authority has to comply with the constitutional
provisions applicable to gaining the position at the time and
place, if any. Finnis’s rule is merely a reincarnation of Hart’s
rule of recognition which simply exists without an ontological
foundation or explained and justified origin.84 As long as one
complies with the fact of the rule of recognition, authority is
justified. Further, Finnis recognizes that not all people to whom
enough people acquiesce are deserving of authority so he has to
borrow from consent theorists and create his own myth, like
Rousseau and Rawls. His is this: “when practically reasonable
79

Id. at 251.
Id. at 252.
81
On this point, Finnis’s claim becomes indistinguishable from H.L.A. Hart’s
argument that the fact of obedience to authority simply must be recognized.
82
FINNIS, supra note 68, at 250.
83
Id.
84
HART, supra note 5, at 97–98 (stating the existence of an unstated and often
unformulated rule of recognition which can have virtually any content as long as it
is in fact used as a rule of recognition by a society).
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subjects, with the common good in view, would think they ought
to consent to it” then they should.85 Thus, a real community has
an obligation to accept an authority when a mythic community of
mythic people would have to do so. When ought they accept an
authority? The full force of Finnis’s utilitarianism is on display
in the answer to this question: “Authority—and thus the
responsibility of governing—in a community is to be exercised by
those who can in fact effectively settle co-ordination problems for
that community.”86 This is another form of fictitious consent:
People are deemed to have consented when they ought to
consent. They ought to obey simply because there is a fact of
authority and there is no other way to get things done.
Some scholars attempt to avoid the utilitarian justification
by claiming that authority is valuable in itself; yet, upon closer
examination their theory is at heart utilitarian. Joseph Raz,
although rejecting a universal obligation to obey the law does
recognize that respect for authority is at least permissible. Raz
concedes that it is permissible to respect the law—at least in a
good legal system—and if you do in fact respect the law then you
may be obligated to obey the law.87 Thus, there is only a
contingent duty to obey an authority; if you respect a particular
legal system’s law then that respect is the source of your
obligation. Raz’s duty can never become completely content
independent. The contingent duty only arises if one judges the
content of a legal system to be good. A flaw in Raz’s argument
can be observed by considering an analogy he uses, friendship.
He argues there is no duty to have friendships but if one in fact
has a friendship then he has a duty to act as a friend towards the
friend.88 For Raz, there is no good in being a legal system or a
good in law itself—regardless of content. Likewise, there is no
good in friendship itself. He fails to see that although one may
have no duty to be a friend to a particular person—or to be
subject to a particular legal system—one does have an obligation
to pursue the good of friendship—due to the social component of
our nature—and law in general. Friendship and, as discussed

85
FINNIS, supra note 68, at 251. Finnis does describe this rule as only a “rule of
thumb” as to when to refuse to obey someone who has garnered acquiescence leaving
the reader in more of a quandary of exactly when authority is justified.
86
Id. at 246.
87
RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW supra note 13, at 250, 260.
88
Id. at 253–54, 256.
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more in the next Part, law are both good because they are a
component of Man’s nature—specifically his social and political
nature—for which Man has a natural inclination.89 Although
there may be no obligation to establish a friendship with a
particular person, one is obligated—naturally inclined by
nature—to friendships and the attainment of friendship is a
good—although there certainly can be degrees of goodness of any
particular friendships. As discussed more in the next Part, Man
is inclined to law and therefore having law is good—although
there are degrees of goodness. For Raz on the other hand, the
attribute of authority of law is not good in and of itself but only
good if one chooses to respect a given legal system. Raz’s
conception thus clearly fails criteria (v), as the obligation is not
universal but only effective for those who have chosen to respect
the law.
Raz’s justification is also not content independent. Unlike
the consent theorists, Raz does argue that legal authorities are to
act based on reasons. “All authoritative directives should be
based, in the main, on reasons which already independently
apply to the subjects of the directives and are relevant to their
action in the circumstances covered by the directive.”90 It is
notable however that Raz does not consider these reasons to be
themselves legal. The authority in issuing a directive is not
necessarily relying on law but in general should be relying on
some undefined type of reasons. The work done by authority for
Raz is simply to add pre-emptive force to the pre-existing
undefined reasons on which the authority’s determination
depends. Raz develops this argument into what he calls a service
conception of authority. Justifying authority “involves showing
that the alleged subject is likely better to comply with reasons
which apply to him . . . if he accepts the directives of the alleged
authority as authoritatively binding and tries to follow them,
rather than trying to follow the reasons which apply to him
directly.”91 Hugo Cyr demonstrates the utilitarian nature of
Raz’s theory by characterizing the service performed by authority
89

See id. at 53–77.
Raz, supra note 6, at 14. Raz never claims that every decision must be based
exclusively on dependent reasons but that they must mostly be. See id. at 16 (“All it
[the Service Conception] requires is that it shall act primarily for dependent
reasons.”).
91
Id. at 18–19; see also JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 53 (Oxford
Univ. Press 1986).
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as merely a “resource-saving” service.92 Rather than having to
spend the time analyzing all our reasons for action, we can
simply obey the decision made by the authority. Yet, as Hugo
Cyr has pointed out, if Raz’s theory is taken literally there is
really no resource saving because in order to know if we should
obey an authority we have to conclude that they do in fact
perform this service—they do primarily base decisions on the
reasons that individuals would otherwise weight for themselves.
Cyr explains, “Moreover, to actually determine whether or not an
authority is worth accepting, according to the Service Conception,
the subject will ultimately have to engage in the very
deliberations that the ‘resource-saving’ feature of the Service
Conception was meant to help the subject avoid.”93
In making this evaluation the subject is analyzing the
content of the authoritative decisions to see if they meet the
standard of being primarily based on the reasons that would
have been considered. Thus, announced rules are not content
independent; they rely for legitimacy on their content meeting
this standard. In undertaking this exercise to determine the
legitimacy of an entity as an authority the subjects end up
“destroy[ing] the authority function of that entity”94 because the
subject has to engage in the same deliberations from which the
authority was supposed to save him. The only way to avoid
destroying the utilitarian benefit of the authority saving decision
making resources of subjects is to abstain from conducting the
necessary evaluation of whether the authority meets the
standard and accept the conclusion “that an entity has a
legitimate authority over us would be ultimately a matter of
faith.”95

92
Hugo Cyr, Functional and Existential Authorities, 28 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 265,
265–288, 271 (2015).
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Id. at 274.
94
Id.
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Stephen Perry summarizes Raz’s argument:
Roughly speaking, the general idea is that, if one will better
comply with right reason in a specified set of circumstances by
allowing oneself to be guided by the judgment of another rather
than by trying to act according to one’s own judgment about
what ought to be done, then one is justified in subjecting one’s
will to that of the other.96

Perry argues that although Raz’s theory might explain the
subjection to the directives of another on some occasions—that is,
when subjection serves conformity with practical reason—it does
not ever provide justification for the power of an authority to
change people’s normative positions in and of itself.97 Essentially
Raz’s position collapses into a form of greater knowledge defense:
One who possesses greater expertise becomes an authority based
on that expertise. That authority is justified because it is based,
although not exclusively, on what he calls dependent reasons,98
reasons which are merely assumed by Raz to exist and which are
not given an ontological, and specifically legal ontological,
explanation. Ultimately, any obligation to obey the law of an
authority is rooted in the claim that in the ideal—that is, if
acting as the experts they are meant to be—they are supposed to
be accessing undefined dependent reasons that apply to their
subjects. Yet, as Perry points out, the fact that someone is
morally obligated to conform to an expert’s advice due to the
wisdom of that advice does not itself prove the expert has moral
power to command the individual to follow that advice.99 The
good advice of the expert contains its own reason for conformity,
its inherent goodness. The reason for conformity does not reside
in the expert but in the advice. As Perry observes, according to
Raz’s view:
96
Perry, supra note 28, at 54. Philip Soper also exposes the utilitarian basis of
Raz’s service conception of authority:
Raz designates his view the ‘service conception’ of authority: government
exists because (and has authority just in case) it does a better job of
advancing the aims of the governed (what ‘ought to be their aims’) than
they could do on their own. The alternative conception might be called the
‘leader’ conception of authority: government exists because (and has
authority just in case) it provides necessary direction in default of
agreement about what are the aims of the governed.
See Soper, supra note 16, at 231–32.
97
Perry, supra note 28, at 51.
98
Raz, supra note 6, at 15.
99
Perry, supra note 28, at 50–51, 57.
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So long as I have reason to know that I will in general do better
in complying with the reasons that apply to me in a given type
of case by following the views of another person rather than by
acting on my own judgment, it does not matter whether those
views are offered in the form of advice or in the form of
directives.100

Raz himself seems to concede that his theory is no more than
the expert explanation of following authority when he admits
that the conditions for the service conception are unlikely to
obtain.101 In the end, the advice of authority may be useful to
acting reasonably but it is only authoritative subjectively for
those who respect a particular legal system and see its laws as
expert advice worthy of respect. In the end authority may be
useful but it is not justified. Raz’s theory fails the universality
condition—condition (v)—because in Raz’s view, a legal directive
binds except when it does not due to other reasons such as
arbitrariness or violation of fundamental human rights.102
Ultimately, Raz’s service conception of authority is merely that—
at the service of other undefined, preexisting reasons which
already apply to people. The authority is justified if its decisions
are most of the time dependent on those reasons except if a
particular decision violates other vague non-legal concepts such
as “human rights.” For Raz, authority may most of the time
make someone more likely to act rationally, but the rationality is
the good and the authority is only most of the time useful. There
is no particular good to authority itself.
The two thinkers who come closest to avoiding the utilitarian
trap and locating the justification for legal authority are Stephen
Perry and Randy Barnett. Perry’s value theory of authority
appears to transcend utilitarianism and sound in substantive
moral argument. He argues that authority is a moral power
conceived as a value based power. His value-based conception
argues that “[l]egitimate moral authority can only exist if there is
something sufficiently good or valuable about one person being
able intentionally to change the normative situation of another

100

Id. at 66.
RAZ, supra note 91, at 70, 76–78, 104.
102
Raz, supra note 6, at 14; see also id. at 15 (“On the contrary, there is no point
in having authorities unless their determinations are binding even if mistaken
(though some mistakes may disqualify them.”). In other words, law should bind
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person.”103 “[T]he moral and conceptual core of the concept of
legitimate political authority” is that “one person has practical
authority over another if there is sufficient value in the former
person’s being able intentionally to change the normative
situation of the latter . . . .”104 Unlike Raz, Professor Perry
recognizes that to justify authority as such, and not just the
authority of a good system or a moral or legal expert, the exercise
of authority must be shown to be a good or valuable. Professor
Perry argues:
One person A has a power to effect a certain kind of change in
the normative situation of another person B if there is reason
for regarding actions which A takes with the intention of
effecting a change of the relevant kind as in fact effecting such a
change, where the justification for so regarding A’s actions is
the sufficiency of the value or desirability of enabling A to make
this kind of normative change by means of this kind of act.”105

Perry sees what utilitarian arguments miss, that the act of
changing people’s normative positions must be explained as a
good act regardless of its instrumental usefulness for some
independent good. The problem that ultimately turns Perry’s
argument into a utilitarian one is that he leaves indeterminate
this value that is authority. He claims:
[My value theory of authority] is not intended to be a
substantive theory addressed to the justification problem, nor
can it operate as such. It is not self-applying; further moral
argument is required to determine what kinds of value (if any)
will justify A’s possession of such a power, as well as to
determine the sufficiency of that value. This information will be
provided by particular substantive theories of justification.106

Thus, in the end, the value of authority is utilitarian for Perry as
authority is only valuable if it can be found to support
attainment of some other undefined value. In other words,
authority is merely the best way to reach some other moral goal
by imposing obligations necessary to achieve it.107 At most,
Perry’s theory provides a hypothetical method for attempting to
justify legal authority. If it can be proven that there is a value

103
104
105
106
107

Perry, supra note 28, at 33–34.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 64.

108

JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES

[Vol. 55:83

served by legal authority, then legal authority can be justified.
To the extent that this conclusion frames the issue for
consideration it is useful, but merely in such a modest capacity.
Although using the language of moral justification, the value
theory still reduces legal authority to a utilitarian role; authority
is still instrumental to another undefined value. Perry would
probably accept this evaluation, as by his own admission he is
only offering a conception of authority and not a justification of
it, which he says must come from political moral theory. The
closest Perry’s theory comes to a real justification is in its
functional or teleological argument. The goal of the state is to
“accomplish particularly important moral goals that states are
uniquely suited, or at least particularly well suited, to achieve on
behalf of their subjects.”108 A power which fulfills this function of
states is good in that it is suited to the function. Authority fits
this function by “means of the normative instrument of a
capacity to impose obligations.”109
In the end, Perry’s argument becomes circular. Authority is
justified because authority serves the function of the state
achieving important moral goals. That is exactly what a theory
of authority is supposed to justify, that another person or
institution should direct individuals to or away from certain
actions. Perry thus only transfers the discussion to the realm of
“moral political philosophy.” If the function of the state as Perry
defines it can be justified in this other epistemological field than
authority is justified because authority fulfills that function.
Authority is left unjustified other than this utilitarian
conclusion. As with the other utilitarian theories, this leaves
criteria (ii) and (v) unmet since authority is only good to the
extent its use or content actually fulfills the state’s purpose.
Also, authority would not bind in a hypothetical situation in
which it could be shown that some other instrument could better
fulfill this function.110
108
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Perry, supra note 28, at 10. Perry does not actually label his argument as
teleological or functional but rather following Leslie Greene, he calls it the “ ‘task
efficacy’ theory of authority.” Perry, supra note 28, at 10.
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Randy Barnett skillfully exposes the inadequacy of consent
theories of legal authority. He keenly notes that even if
universal consent were possible, which it is not, consent would
only be meaningful if there were a real right not to consent.111
Thus, even on the consent theorists own terms, something must
pre-exist consent, the right to consent or not. Barnett uses this
realization to ground legal authority not in consent but in rights.
The assumption that ‘first come rights, then comes government’
helps explain how lawmaking can be legitimate in the absence
of consent. For a law would be just, and therefore binding in
conscience, if its restrictions on a citizen’s freedom were
(1) necessary to protect the rights of others, and (2) proper
insofar as they did not violate the preexisting rights of the
persons on whom they were imposed. The second of these
requirements dispenses with the need to obtain the consent of
the person on whom a law is imposed.112

He explains, “Therefore, when we move outside a community
constituted by unanimous consent, laws must be scrutinized to
ensure both that they are necessary and that they do not
improperly infringe upon the rights retained by the people.”113
As perceptive as Barnett’s argument is in exposing the failure of
consent theories, he fails to ground his rights come first theory in
a solid ontology and ultimately succumbs to the utilitarian trap.
First, he substitutes rights for consent in his legal ontology. In
the order of being first comes rights and then comes law which is
legitimized through its respect for the preexisting rights. Yet,
Barnett fails to find an origin for the preexisting rights. He
merely assumes their existence and dispenses with the need for
any particular content informing the rights on which legal
legitimacy rests:
“One need not accept any particular
formulation of background rights, however, to accept the
conception of constitutional legitimacy advanced here.”114 If he is
correct that respect for rights removes the need for consent, the
conclusion begs the question of the nature and origin of these
is that God intends that human authorities exist to make determinations of Natural
Law. Prospectivity exists because it is expected that people should obey because
there is a delegated authority which has been transmitted from the source of the
legal architecture of the universe.
111
Barnett, supra note 11, at 141–42.
112
Id. at 142; see also id. at 145 (reiterating this two-part test).
113
Id. at 142.
114
Id. at 141.
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rights. Barnett fails to answer this question. If rights are going
to legitimize the power to coerce action independently of the
content of the command, how can one evaluate the claim to
legitimacy without knowing the content of those rights that are
determinative in the justification? Thus, ultimately his theory of
legal authority is based in a pre-supposed abstract rule such as
Hart’s Rule of Recognition and Kelsen’s basic norm. Barnett’s
rights simply exist without cause, explanation, or necessary
definition. They, like the rule of recognition and the basic norm,
are an unjustified black box.115 Once the ontologically empty
concept of rights is assumed, then Barnett falls into the
utilitarian trap. Laws are justified to the extent that they are
useful to safeguard the preexisting rights.
Laws remain
utilitarian for Barnett, but he has simply substituted rights for
happiness or pleasure or whatever term the particular utilitarian
chooses to employ. There is no good in law itself. It is merely
useful to protect the assumed but undefined background rights.
Ultimately, all the utilitarian claims to justification of
authority as instrumentally good amount to unproven and
unprovable claims that some group possesses some unique skill
set that will allow them to manage society better than others for
some purpose, value, or undefined set of rights. As Alasdair
MacIntyre has argued, this claim is merely a fiction created to
justify the fact of the power of managerial bureaucrats over
society.116 Essentially the utilitarian claim to legal authority is
open to use by those in power or those seeking to overthrow those
in power by simply asserting, “We are the best experts in law
making and you are better off under our control.” Such assertion
lacks any justified reason for believing the claim to be true.
Consent and utilitarian theories fail to justify the power to
change people’s normative positions. All the theories considered
fail because they lack any ontological grounding; they fail to
identify anything other than a myth to explain the origin of
authority and they fail to articulate any goodness in authority
other than its usefulness.

115
At one point, Barnett switches his language from talking about rights to
justice. Id. at 144. Justice might be able to serve as a source of obligation for action.
Yet, Barnett fails to define justice as anything other than the rights he simply
assumes to exist.
116
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 75–77 (2d ed., Notre Dame Univ. Press
2007).
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II. THE NATURAL LAW JUSTIFICATION OF AUTHORITY
Having failed to find a satisfactory justification for authority
in consent or utilitarian theories, this Part argues that
traditional natural law theory provides a satisfactory grounding
for legal authority. This Part has two objectives. First, it shows
that the natural law justification provides ontology for human
legal authority. Classical natural law jurisprudence provides a
home for legal authority within the architecture of law resting on
a solid ontological foundation. In doing so, this Part begins as
Stephen Perry suggests by addressing the “ ‘existence conditions’
for a power to change through legal authority people’s normative
position rather than on conditions that will justify the supposedly
mediating conclusion that there exists a (general) moral
obligation to obey the law.”117 After exploring the proof of such
power’s existence, the obligation to obey the laws made by the
authority is explained and can then be limited. Second, this Part
demonstrates that the natural law argument satisfies Leslie
Green’s criteria for a successful argument for an obligation to
obey the law.
A.

The Creation of Legal Ontology

The natural law justification of authority can be summed up
in the old saying: “All authority comes from God.”118 Pope Leo
XIII noted that the notion of legal authority deriving from the
people was a departure from classical Catholic jurisprudence,
which held “the origin of authority in God as a natural and
necessary principle.”119 Joseph Raz admits that all authority
must be conferred by another.120 Raz explains that Kelsen’s legal
theory recognizes the need for an external single norm to move
from “is” to “ought” and validate all laws. According to Raz,
117

Perry, supra note 28, at 4.
RICHARD FLATHMAN, POLITICAL OBLIGATION 215 (Atheneum 1972).
119
Leo XIII, Diuturnum, no. 5., available at http://w2.vatican.va/content/leoxiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_29061881_diuturnum.html (last visited
July 29, 2016) (“[V]ery many men of more recent times, walking in the footsteps of
those who in a former age assumed to themselves the name of philosophers, say that
all power comes from the people; so that those who exercise it in the State do so not
as their own, but as delegated to them by the people, and that, by this rule, it can be
revoked by the will of the very people by whom it was delegated. But from these,
Catholics dissent, who affirm that the right to rule is from God, as from a natural
and necessary principle.”).
120
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Kelsen admits some natural law is needed to have any law.121
Kelsen admits that without his basic norm as presupposed there
is no law. “[A]n anarchist . . . who denied the validity of the
hypothetical basic norm of positive law . . . will view its positive
regulation of human relationships . . . as mere power
relations . . . .”122 It is the basic norm that saves Kelsen’s system
from being Hart’s gunman. But for Kelsen, there is no ontology
for this basic norm; it is just an uncaused cause for the entire
legal system which he has assumed to exist because it must
exist.123 In Raz’s words, for Kelsen, “It does not make sense with
regard to any basic norm to ask when it was created, by whom or
how. These categories simply do not apply to it.”124 Without
admitting so, Kelsen and Raz have simply come to the same
conclusion that philosophers reached thousands of years ago. If
the principle of origin of law is an uncaused cause, then that
principle must be the uncaused cause of everything. C. G.
Bateman observes:
[F]rom Hammurabi to Hadrian, and even on past to the
Hapsburgs, the only affective benefactor of sovereignty was, at
least in theory, the deity. In societies where religion was the
fundamental framework of daily life for all classes, rulers, for
the sake of legitimacy, had to acknowledge that it was the God
or ‘the gods’ who had bequeathed their sovereignty. In this
context sovereignty was never aggregately or individually
understood as solely attached to either the will or skill of
personages, it came from the deity.125

St. Paul expresses the same argument succinctly: “[A]uthority
comes from God only, and all authorities that hold sway are of
his ordinance.”126 J.D. Goldsworthy concludes that only with God
can morality successfully claim that “its precepts are
authoritatively binding in a sense which transcends even
enlightened self-interest.”127 His claim holds equally true for law.
121
122

Id. at 124–25, 129, 132–33.
HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 413 (Russell & Russell

1945).
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Even if Michael Moore’s argument were correct, which this
author does not believe to be the case, and society could have
good without God,128 he fails to even raise the related question,
can we have authority without God? Even if Moore proves that
there is good and that people should do good because of the
reality of morality, such proof fails to explain why any person
should have the power to change the normative position of
another by determining what is good for him in a particular
circumstance when good can be done in two or more morally
ambivalent ways. Socrates, unlike Moore, saw the good, God,
and authority as intimately linked.
For Socrates, it is not enough that kings or oligarchs, or even
citizens, wield the largest share of political power in their
states, it is whether that sovereign power is the product of the
‘good[.’] As to the fountainhead of this notion of ‘good,’ like many
of the theorists who ended up weighing in on sovereignty after
Socrates, he appealed to God.129

Even Emperor Frederick II, not the most pious of Christian
rulers, felt the need to acknowledge in promulgating legislation
for the Kingdom of Sicily the ultimate origin of law in God.
“After Divine Providence had formed the universe, . . . [God] put
[His rational creatures] under a certain law . . . .”130 The modern
crisis of justifying authority emerged when the notion of legal
authority became detached completely from God so that political
theory could imagine the state as being sovereign in its own
right, whereas the time of Constantine’s sovereign authority was
“thought to be under the jurisdiction and control of God.”131
In Kelsen’s language—and this may be the bit of natural law
Raz admits Kelsen needs—the basic norm is therefore the
Eternal Law, an omnipresent foundation or starting point.
Whereas Kelsen merely asserts the necessity of a basic norm,
which has no ontology other than to fulfill a need to exist to make
Kelsen’s jurisprudence complete, the Eternal Law has a complete
ontology, discussed in a prior article.132 The Eternal Law is the
128
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only law, which is an uncaused cause since the Eternal Law is
nothing other than the Divine Wisdom ordering the universe.133
The Eternal Law legislates the ends of things, including legal
authority and human law. If we can find authority legislated
into the Eternal Law, we will have found a source from which all
subsequent authority can be derived. Yet, we come to know the
content of the Eternal Law not directly, but through our
participation in the Eternal Law through the Natural Law.134
Likewise we encounter the Natural Law not solely in the abstract
but through the developing customary history of real political
communities. Thus, by dialectically examining the authority
exercised in actual, historically developing communities, we can
find the origin of authority in the Eternal Law. In this sense,
Leo XIII argued the principle that all authority comes from God
is a “natural and necessary principle.”135 It is necessary since, as
even Kelsen acknowledged, authority must ultimately derive
from a necessary being or an uncaused cause. It is natural
because we come to know of its existence through the natural
law.
St. Thomas begins his consideration of sovereign authority
by considering Man’s ends.136 By doing such, he begins with the
Eternal and Natural Law. The Eternal Law establishes the ends
of Man’s nature.137 Those ends become known through the
natural inclinations which direct Man. Yet, as Jean Porter
argues, even though the principles of Natural Law, “are
accessible to reflective judgement,” their relative indeterminacy
means they are not sufficient in themselves “to govern conduct or
to provide adequate structures for social activities.”138 The
principles permit a realm of choice among particular ways of
conforming to Natural Law. Individuals must make some of
those elections, but others cannot be left to each individual.139 A
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component of Man’s ends is living in society.140 The existence of
communities is therefore commensurate with human nature.141
Man is meant to live in a society. Since a community is a
heterogeneous organism, it needs a principle of order to unify
it.142 Authority is therefore both “appropriate and . . . necessary”
because in order to be effective in a social context, the
determinations of Natural Law which affect the common good
Yet, since the
will have to be “public and . . . stable.”143
indeterminacy of Natural Law allows for more than one—
although not an unlimited—rational choice, there will be an
element of contingency to the any particular election made—the
right as opposed to the left side of the road, for example.144 As a
result, Jean Porter concludes, “it must be imposed in some way if
it is to [be] a cogent claim, having binding force within a context
The nature of making particular
of human relations.”145
determinations for a society requires that the election be both an
act of reason—it must conform to the rational principles of
Natural Law—and an act of the will—be an authoritative,
binding choice among permissible possibilities. “[A]uthority
serves to bring a relatively final, public, and generally acceptable
specificity to indeterminate rational and natural principles in
such a way as to create a framework for shared activities of
diverse kinds.”146
B.

From Necessary to Good

Yet, the explanation in Section A appears on the surface to
be utilitarian. Authority is justified because it is necessary to
make social life possible. Yet, this appearance is only superficial.
Authority is not only necessary, but also, as Porter says,
appropriate and is in fact good. Authority fulfills a particular
need for public and definitive determinations to be made for
individuals in a social context. Yet, both that social context and
the necessity that authority satisfies have been willed by Divine
Providence. The indeterminacy of Natural Law and hence the
140
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need for authority is not accidental but has been intentionally
written into the legal fabric of the universe. Put another way,
human authority was not strictly necessary. The Eternal Law
could have specified all principles of action in the Natural and
Divine Law leaving no room for determination. God chose to
leave this task, in a sense, unfinished and thus intended the need
that authority satisfies. Unlike the scholastic jurists of the
classical Natural Law tradition, early modern Natural Law
theorists like Blackstone envisioned human law as being made
by copying necessary specific precepts of Natural Law into
human law.147 In contrast, the Medieval scholastics understood
the relationship to be more complex; Natural Law, and even to
some extent, Divine positive law,148 was indeterminate and in
fact required human law makers to actively provide that
determination. Professor Porter explains:
[R]ather than regarding social conventions as more or less
direct and unchangeable expressions of human nature, they
emphasize the need for processes of rational, communally
shared deliberation, in order to move from natural principles to
their conventional formulations. . . . These general principles [of
Natural Law] are accessible to reflective judgment, and yet they
remain relatively indeterminate, in such a way that they are
not sufficient to govern conduct or to provide adequate
structures for social activities. Seen in this context, relations of
authority appear as appropriate and sometimes necessary
elements in the social life of rational animals. The rational
principles of [N]atural [L]aw must be specified in order to be put
into practice, and yet these specifications cannot be left to
individual judgments; they must be generally accepted in order
to provide a framework for social activities, and that means at
least that they must be public and relatively stable.149

The indeterminacy of Natural Law is not a fault or failing of
Natural Law that needs to be fixed by inventing the concept of
legal authority. It is an intentional indeterminacy legislated into
the legal system by the ultimate legislator through the Eternal
Law. God wanted rational creatures to participate more actively
than Blackstone’s idea of copying out pre-formulated precepts. If
147

Id. at 63–64.
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Natural and Divine Law explicitly contained all particular
determinations of right action, there would be no room for the
election of means—the realm of human liberty.
Human
authority is necessary and useful—as the instrumental
arguments of the utilitarians suggest—yet it is more than that.
It is good because God, the author of law, wishes humans to
participate in the making of laws that govern their communal
activity.
He provides for the further specification and
determination of general public precepts by one having care of a
community, by particular human beings exercising law-making
authority. This authority ultimately resides in God but is
delegated and shared with human agents through the intentional
indeterminacy contained in the revelation of Eternal Law
through Natural and Divine positive law. To fully understand
human legal authority in these terms, this Article returns to
what has been established about Eternal Law and its relation to
Natural Law and human positive law in prior articles.150
The Eternal Law, although fixing the ends of creatures, does
not fix for Man the means to those ends. The Eternal Law
legislates the course of these means only in general by
implanting the natural inclinations. The Eternal Law requires
the cooperation of human agents in determining the particular
election of proportionate means through working out
determinations of the principles of natural law in contingent
circumstances.151
These particular determinations are made within a threefold
order of authorities: the individual, the familial, and the
regnative.152 The Eternal and Natural Laws leave some of these
necessary determinations to each individual to determine.153
Others are determined for individuals by the authority of their
personal, not strictly speaking legal, superiors154—those
possessing authority in an imperfect or nonpolitical community,
that is, parents for children in a family.
Finally, those
determinations that affect “the common good”155 are left “to the
discretion of those who were to have spiritual or temporal charge
150
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of others.”156 The first two orders are only analogous to law,
which properly exists only in the third. Why is the sanction of
law better than each determining for himself—or each superior of
a nonpolitical community determining for it—all the individual
cases? The first answer is that the common good requires it. By
definition, the individual cases which should be addressed by
human law rather than individual decision are those affecting
the common good. Just as those decisions not affecting the
common but only a personal good should be left out of human
law, those cases which do affect the common good should be
determined not by private individuals but by those having
“spiritual or temporal charge of others.”157 Francisco Suárez
demonstrates that such an authority is needed to govern any
society.158 He explains, “[N]o body can be preserved unless there
exists some principle whose function it is to provide for and seek
after the common good thereof, such a principle clearly exists in
the natural body, and likewise (so experience teaches) in the
political.”159 A homogeneous body such as an animal has
instincts which serve the unifying purpose of directing the whole
animal to its end, survival. In Man, the rational soul serves this
purpose. Thus, in the heterogeneous body of politics a principle
of order must govern the heterogeneous parts because each
individual in a society looks after his own cares and these
sometimes are contrary to the common good. Also, sometimes
there are things that are necessary for the common good but are
not directly pertinent all the time to individuals so not all will
work toward them without direction.160
Governed society thus provides for peace and order among
people and families and for the avoidance and correction of
injustices.161 Beyond the organic unity of the individual, the
heterogeneous organisms of the family and a perfect community
thus require a principle of order to govern determinations
necessary under Natural Law to reach Man’s end. Although the
form and nature of the authority to determine rules of action
varies from the individual to civil society, the source and
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principle is the same: the provision for human determination of
principles of Natural Law provided by the Divine Wisdom in the
Eternal Law. God could have provided this principle of order
directly, but he chose to provide for the participation of human
agents—the individual’s reason and will, the personal superior,
and legal authorities. These authorities are good not by virtue of
any internal cause but because they participate in the ultimate
legal authority ruling the universe, God. The third form of
authority, to make laws for a community, is the subject of this
Article and so it turns to consider its origin and nature.
St. Thomas explains that when one is directed to an end
exterior to oneself one needs a guide to direct to that end.162 The
etymology of the word gubernator—one in authority of a polis—is
related to the nautical term for a pilot,163 who is one who directs a
ship to an exterior end, the port. Since the end of the common
good is external to Man, there is need for such a guide, an
authority.
As a social being, Man’s individual end, the
fulfillment of his nature, is inextricably caught up in the end of
the society of which he forms a part, the common good. Thus, a
need for a directive authority in the sphere of determinations
beyond those within the determination of the individual is part of
the legal architecture itself and would be present even in a
theoretical community of saints not affected by the “wounding of
nature.”164
Classical natural law jurisprudence understands legal
authority to be existential rather than functional. The good or
end of a thing is the fullness of its being.165 Professor Hugo Cyr
distinguishes the former type of authority as one in which those
subject to it see their existence and identity as existentially
connected to the authority. He contrasts this type of authority to
mere functional authority which exists solely for instrumental
efficiency.166 Clearly utilitarian theories can only justify the thin
functional form of authority. Although consent theories may
come closer to justifying existential authorities since the theory
sees authority as the expression of popular consent, ultimately it
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fails to do so. As argued earlier, the consent is only at best
fictional. Beyond its expositive failure, being rooted in consent it
only justifies authority because it is useful or beneficial to the
consenting parties. The natural law tradition understands legal
authority to be existential and an inherent part of a person’s
identity as part of a common political community through which
the perfection of human nature must be pursued by obeying the
determinations of Natural Law made by those entrusted with
care of that community. It is not simply that authority makes
life more efficient. Authority is existentially connected to a social
being and we are existentially connected to society by the natural
inclination to live in society. Without authority we could not be
fully what our nature is designed to be. As Jean Porter has
observed, “[I]t addresses one of the pervasive needs of human
life, since without a whole range of shared activities, we as
rational, social animals could not live—fully, or perhaps at all—
in the way characteristic to us as a specific kind of living
creature.”167
Authority is thus more than a necessary evil instituted after
the loss of original justice; ordered determination by an authority
predates destruction of the Natural Law in us.168 The Eternal
Law by fixing a social element in Man’s nature and by entrusting
particular determinations to human agents, makes the presence
of an authority, one charged with care of the social community in
its quest for the common good,169 a good. The making of
determinations of law that guide toward the common good is the
end or purpose of authority fixed by the Eternal Law. A proper
understanding of the necessity and goodness for human
determination of Natural Law refutes Kelsen’s claim that
knowledge of Natural Law would make human positive law
superfluous.170 Far from being a “foolish effort at artificial
illumination in bright sunshine,”171 the making of human law
involves the rational selection among several determinations in
the bright light of Natural Law. Perhaps Kelsen’s dismissal of
Natural Law resulted from his misunderstanding the classical
doctrine’s explanation of the divinely desired indispensable role
167
168
169
170
171
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for human law to make determinations of the general principles
of Natural Law. The making of human law is a good: It is the
attainment of a natural end.172 Human society, or the social
aspect of human nature, is naturally inclined to be directed by
law. Thus, the fulfillment of that natural inclination—the
formulation of determinate laws—is good. In the words of Jean
Porter, “Authority thus shares in the goodness, the attractive
power, and the rational cogency of proper to human life as
such.”173
C.

From the Good of Authority to the Virtue of Obedience

Not only do consent and utilitarian theories fail to
adequately explain the origin of legal authority, but they also
consider authority or the power to affect the normative position
of others as at best neutral and at worst an evil, albeit a
necessary evil. Obedience may be necessary, but it is not good
according to this dim view of authority. Utilitarian theories find
no good in this power to change normative duties and the
obligation to obey but accept the fact as justified only to the
extent that it can produce other goods. Consent theorists start
from the premise that authority restricts individual freedom and
is therefore problematic. This problematic interference with
freedom that a duty to obey another person creates can then only
be justified if freely given consent accepts it. Obedience is
justified only as an act of freedom through consent. The
understanding of authority rooted in the natural law tradition
offers a much stronger ontology—one that not merely accepts
authority as necessary but as good. Obeying the law is therefore
not only necessary, but also an authentic good commensurate
with human nature. Leo Strauss argues that since Man is
naturally social and therefore the restraint of freedom is natural,
too, and therefore it is good for Man. Man cannot associate
without restraint on freedom involved in a duty to obey. He
explains:

172
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Man is so built that he cannot achieve the perfection of his
humanity except by keeping down his lower impulses. He
cannot rule his body by persuasion. . . . What is true of selfrestraint, self-coercion, and power over one’s self applies in
principle to the restraint and coercion of others and to power
over others. . . . To say that power as such is evil or corrupting
would therefore amount to saying that virtue is evil or
corrupting.174

The dim view of restraint as unnatural and evil is evident in
Enlightenment authors such as Jean Jacques Rousseau175 and
constitutes an often unstated premise of consent and utilitarian
justifications of authority. For this contrary view, restraint—and
therefore every virtue—is corrupting of freedom. Law involves
restraint and this restrain is unnatural, at best conventional.
For the classical tradition, however, restraint of action is on the
contrary good and natural, in fact virtuous. Strauss explains, “If
restraint is as natural to man as is freedom, and restraint must
in many cases be forcible restraint in order to be effective, one
cannot say that the city is conventional or against nature because
it is coercive society.”176
Postclassical jurisprudence is therefore uncomfortable with
and thus continually in search of a justification for a coercive
authority. The distinction with the armed gunman haunts Hart’s
analysis. The best they can produce is an assumed basic norm or
rule that must exist to justify the existence of a legal system.
Hart and Austin were wrong in concluding that various societies
each need their own absolute, in the absence of which there
would be no legal system.177 This assumption arises from the
premise that law and authority are not natural and therefore
only conventional. In the absence of convention there would
therefore be no legal system. Yet, a legal order although making
use of conventional elements is ontologically natural. There is
always a cosmic legal system by virtue of the existence of the
ultimate sovereign, the Promulgator of Eternal Law. There may
be no specifically human legal system in a particular time and
space—in a civil grouping in a state of anarchy for example. This
174
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lack of a human legal system in a particular area would stem not
from the lack of an unlimited human sovereign but rather the
lack of someone with care of a community to make the necessary
legal determinations of Natural Law for that civil society. There
is no need for a sovereign in Austin’s terms, but there is a need
for someone filling the office of determination maker under
Natural Law, or in the phrase of Jean Porter, a “minister of the
law.”178 If such an office is vacant, there is no functioning
particular human legal system in such area but a legal system
still exists, albeit one requiring further determination. There is
always a legal system as no one is outside the Eternal, Natural,
and Divine Law. The need for a human authority arises from the
intentional indeterminacy of Natural Law. Unlike Hart, who
lamented the indeterminacy “handicap” in law,179 this view of
authority rejoices in the indeterminacy within the Natural Law.
This indeterminacy is a gift of God providing the opportunity for
us to participate in the divine action of making law by
determining the Natural Law.
The conforming of our individual actions to the
determinations of those charged by the Eternal Law with this
responsibility of making determinations is thus a fulfillment of
an aspect of human nature. Obedience to the law is thus a
natural inclination in the sense discussed in a prior article.180
Due to the social aspect of our nature, we have a natural
inclination to obey the law. According to the Thomist Jeremiah
Newman, justice is good under the aspect of due, and legal justice
involves a case where due arises under the divine or human
law.181 Thus, doing what is due under the determinations of
human law constitutes a good act because it is a legally just act.
Aristotle argues that good government consists in two essential
elements: good laws and the obedience of citizens to the laws.182
St. Thomas treats the virtue of obedience as a species of the
virtue of justice.183 Obedience is the virtue whereby individuals
allow their free determination of actions to be directed by the
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command of another.184 Aquinas explains the naturalness of
obedience to authority: “Wherefore just as in virtue of the
divinely established natural order the lower natural things need
to be subject to the movement of the higher, so too in human
affairs, in virtue of the order of natural and divine law, inferiors
are bound to obey their superiors.”185 Not only is the power to
make determinations affecting the common good derived from
the Eternal Law, but the obligation to obey is also found in the
Eternal Law through the Natural Law which contains a
secondary precept that superiors ought to be obeyed within the
scope of their authority. Obedience to the law is thus a good in
and of itself because one who obeys participates in the end of
good government of society. All laws which are just and ordained
to the common good are binding in conscience. The law binds by
virtue of legal justice. Its breach may in a particular case
constitute merely a minor infringement of legal justice but it still
impugns it. Obedience to these laws is thus a moral act. There
is no such thing as purely penal laws—laws which do not bind in
conscience but for which one must pay the price if caught—as
some modern theorists have suggested.186
This conclusion requires a different analysis of Joseph Raz’s
traffic light example.187 He posits as a legitimate law the
requirement to stop at a red traffic light. He then assumes a
case in which disregarding the red light will not result in any
danger to anyone, including the driver, and will not diminish
anyone’s respect for law or those who make it, including the
driver’s. Since in this case, disobedience would not affect any of
the purposes of the law—specific and general—as Raz conceives
of them, Raz concludes “that in this case or a similar case the
utterances of authority can be held to be legitimate without
holding them to constitute reasons for action.”188 Raz does not
see that obeying the law, even in such a circumstance, is good
because doing so constitutes a good act—a virtuous act of legal
justice and participation in good government by obeying the
particular determinations of the constituted authority. The only
difference between a normal case and this special case of a
184
185
186
187
188
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deserted intersection is that fewer social consequences result
from an act of disobedience in the deserted intersection. For the
motorist, however, he has forfeited the opportunity to practice
the virtue of legal justice. Thus, there is only a difference in the
scope of the consequences flowing from running the red light, not
a change in the binding obligation to stop due to human legal
determination.
Beyond the goodness of authoritative determinations in and
of themselves, another good of obedience to legal authorities can
be discovered in light of the obstacles to virtue created by the
wounding of nature.189 Aristotle noted this good of obedience in
his discussion of virtue. His argument in favor of authority is
based on the observation that virtue requires not simply
understanding but action.190 It is not enough to know what is
virtuous to be virtuous, one has to do it. Some people, either
through a gift of nature or good training, will act according to
virtue once they hear an argument as to what is virtuous; but not
all are this way. Some are ruled more by their passions and will
not be persuaded by argument. They require an act of the will to
be moved to virtue because passions respond more to force than
argument. Therefore, laws are needed both to urge people to
virtue by directing to the good they can will themselves and to
compel others, “for most people obey necessity rather than
argument.”191 The Digest agrees that it is of the very essence of
law to command.192 St. Thomas defines a command as the act of
moving “by reason and will.”193 As was discussed in a prior
article, law must be a dictate of natural reason whereby it guides
the reason of those under the law to know the good.194 Since the
wounding of nature affects both the reason and the will, human
law cannot remain merely a dictate of reason—which would
merely support the expert notion of authority. Since passions,
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which can direct the will away from the true good, respond to
commands not rational arguments, human law must also be an
act of coercion.
To understand this further value of authority it is necessary
to discuss the interdependent relationship between personal
moral virtue and the common good, which is the end of law.
Although law is directed to the common good in contrast to
individual or purely personal goods, the common good is related
to individuals. In the preface to Charles de Koninck’s work
dedicated to the relationship of the common good to individuals,
J.M. Cardinal Villeneuve summarizes the interconnectedness:
[The common good is] the greatest good of the singular, not by
being a collection of singular goods, but best for each of the
particular individuals who participate in it precisely on account
of its being common. Those who defend the primacy of the
singular good of the singular person suppose a false notion of
the common good as if it were alien to the good of the singular;
whereas it is natural and proper that the singular seek more
the good of the species than his singular good. Since the person,
an intellectual substance, is a part of the universe in whom the
perfection of the whole universe can exist according to
knowledge, his most proper good as intellectual substance will
be the good of the universe, which is an essentially common
good. . . . It is true also that a person can perversely prefer his
own singular good to the common good, attaching himself to the
singularity of his person, or as we say today to his personality,
set up as a common measure of all good. Furthermore, if the
reasonable creature cannot entirely limit himself to a
subordinate common good, such as the family or political
society, this is not because his particular good as such is
greater; it is because of his proper ordination to a superior
common good to which he is principally ordered. In this case,
the common good is not sacrificed to the good of the individual
as individual, but to the good of the individual insofar as the
latter is ordered to a more universal common good, indeed to
God. A society consisting of persons who love their private good
above the common good, or who identify the common good with
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a private good, is not a society of free men, but of tyrants, who
menace each other by force, and in which the final head is
merely the most astute and the strongest among the tyrants,
the subjects being nothing but frustrated tyrants.195

The common good is that external good or end common to all
members of the society. Attainment of the common good cannot
be achieved separately from individuals pursuing their
individual end or good because the common good of the society is
constituted by the same end as individuals, the perfection of the
aspects of human nature. Since human nature involves a social
aspect, the perfection of virtue of each individual is a component
of attainment of the common good. Thus, in pursuing the
common good, the law has an interest in the individual moral
determinations of the individuals of society. As a social animal,
Man works toward his individual good as part of a society, as
part of a whole working to the common good of all. Thus, part of
the purpose of law in pursuing the common good is to assist
individuals in making personal determinations conforming to the
Natural Law. It then becomes necessary to consider the nature
of this relationship between law and personal determinations.
Any human participation in the Eternal Law will be
imperfect. The act of determining individual cases to conform to
virtue is difficult—involving an effort of reason. In the words of
St. Thomas, “[I]t is difficult to see how man could suffice for
himself in the matter [training himself to be virtuous].”196
Consequently, Aristotle and St. Thomas suggest recourse to a
proven good or wise man. As discussed above, those possessing
the habit of justice, the wise, are more likely to be correct in
particular determinations. Their conclusions are more likely to
correspond to the specific truths contained in the Eternal
Wisdom.
Thus, contrary to modern liberal individualistic
philosophy the determination of acts solely by autonomous
individuals is not an ideal that would be preferable but for the
practical need to coordinate choices. Individual choice aided by
recourse to the wisdom of human law is preferable. The difficulty
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in making good determinations indicates that individuals need to
look outside themselves for assistance when determining their
own particular acts. For this reason, St. Thomas explains that a
system of formulated human laws should include general
principles of action in addition to the particular determinations
affecting the common good.197 Human laws include not only
specific determinations but also deductions of principles from
Natural Law.198 Particular individual decisions are aided by
having recourse to general principles deduced from Natural law
by a legal authority. Although speaking about the relationship
between judges and lawmakers, his analysis applies more
generally:
As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 1), “it is better that all things
be regulated by law, than left to be decided by judges”: and this
for three reasons. First, because it is easier to find a few wise
men competent to frame right laws, than to find the many who
would be necessary to judge aright of each single case.—
Secondly, because those who make laws consider long
beforehand what laws to make; whereas judgment on each
single case has to be pronounced as soon as it arises: and it is
easier for man to see what is right, by taking many instances
into consideration, than by considering one solitary fact.—
Thirdly, because lawgivers judge in the abstract and of future
events; whereas those who sit in judgment judge of things
present, towards which they are affected by love, hatred, or
some kind of cupidity; wherefore their judgment is perverted.
Since then the animated justice of the judge is not found in
every man, and since it can be deflected, therefore it was
necessary, whenever possible, for the law to determine how to
judge, and for very few matters to be left to the decision of
men.199

Note, this is a tempered assessment of the question. St. Thomas
does leave room for some “few” case by case determinations but
argues that “whenever possible,” there should be laws formulated
in general by a few wise men who would, being distanced from
human emotions which can distort the consideration of specific
cases, be more likely to reach the just conclusion. In a sense, St.
197
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Thomas is stating an old legal maxim familiar to most lawyers,
namely that bad facts make bad law. If law is solely a product of
unrelated case-by-case rulings of particulars by individuals, it is
likely that the unique and potentially emotionally compelling
aspects of the individual case will lead to a bad law, a bad
decision. Thus, ex ante formulation of a general rule can be more
likely to be correct.
St. Thomas does not advocate the
formulation of an all-encompassing omnibus code for “[c]ertain
individual facts which cannot be covered by the law” need to be
left to individual judgment.200 Alasdair MacIntyre uses the
analogy of a craft to describe the development of virtue.201 One
learning a craft must advance under the direction of a master
who guides by virtue of his authority the transformation within
the apprentice into one who has internally mastered the craft.
Just as those learning the art of building need a teacher to guide
the development of their habit, the community needs an
authority to guide the development of individual choices. Laws
that contain deductions of general principles from Natural Law
guide individuals without completely determining individual
actions, leaving the final choices of action to individuals within
the bounds of the general principles. Such laws generally
prescribe virtue rather than prohibit vice. In this sense, human
law directs individual acts as well as coordinating those acts to
the common good. In guiding individual determinations, law
does not exceed the bounds of its direction to the common good.
Since assisting individuals in making good individual
determinations is inextricably connected to the common good, the
law orients to the common good even when it guides individuals
in making particular determinations for themselves.
For Aristotle and St. Thomas, the two major qualifications
for one to assume legal authority in a regime are that he be
virtuous—the wise—and that he act for the common good.202
Thus, it is prudent to leave the determination of particular rules
affecting the common good to those who are supposed to be wise
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and virtuous, the ruling authorities, temporal and spiritual.203
The reference to both temporal and spiritual authorities as
instruments of human determinations is an important point to
note for our time. Both religious and civil authorities have the
obligation and freedom to make particular determinations of the
Natural Law within the appropriate spheres of their jurisdiction.
Thus, not all laws enacted to aid individual moral determinations
need be made by temporal authorities. St.Thomas is speaking of
authority in general, and he envisions a plurality of authority in
distinct but overlapping spheres, overlapping in that they all
relate to the same subject—individuals making determinations of
actions under the Eternal Law. Harold Berman argues that this
plurality of overlapping jurisdictions was a central feature of the
traditional understanding of legal authority.204 This conception
differs greatly from contemporary visions of authority as
monolithic and monopolistically controlled by a single human
legal sovereign as Austin envisions.
Thus, authority serves two distinct but related roles which
can be summarized in the statement that authorities make laws
which directly or indirectly affect the common good. Some laws
directly affect the common good by making particular
determinations for actions so as to orient those actions to, and
coordinate them with respect to, the common good. Some laws
also aid individuals in attaining their personal end, their
personal good, by providing guidance in the form of deduced
principles of Natural Law. In such a way, the law indirectly aims
at the common good by guiding individuals whose individual
choices inextricably affect the common good.
This insight provides part of the answer to Hart’s question of
what distinguishes the coerced compliance with the demand of a
gunman from the obedience to the law.205 First, the lawmaker is
entrusted with the power to require obedience to a command
which is a determination of Natural Law; the gunman is a self203
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appointed commander. The legal authority is empowered to
command for the purposes of guiding individuals to actions which
are oriented to the common good, a good which by its very nature
includes the good of the individual commanded. The gunman
commands action which is oriented solely to his individual
advantage and not to the common good. Secondly, the power to
command is entrusted to the legal authority from a superior
authority, God and His Eternal Law. God provides for the
exercise of authority by those entrusted with care of the common
good. The gunman usurps authority for himself for the purposes
of advancing his own personal good. Even though both a
legitimate authority and the gunman coupled their command
with a threat of consequences for disobedience, the difference
between the two is that a legal authority is given this power to
command and threaten from a superior authority. The gunman
usurps the power for himself. As Hart rightly argued, the
presence of a threat of punishment is insignificant to legitimize
authority.206 Yet, since Hart rejects the delegation of authority
from outside a particular legal system, he is forced to ground the
obligation to obey legal authority on the negative consequences of
disobedience albeit defined more broadly than those of a gunman.
Hart explains, “Rules are conceived and spoken of as imposing
obligations when the general demand for conformity is insistent
and the social pressure brought to bear upon those who deviate
or threaten to deviate is great.”207 Hart thus ends up basing the
obligation to obey internally on social pressures to conform,
resulting in no qualitative difference between law and the
gunman. The difference is only one of quantity. The gunman’s
threat is backed merely by himself and his gun; the law’s threat
is backed by broader social pressure. It is still a threat that
makes a law obligatory for Hart. The classical Natural Law
explanation avoids reliance on threats of consequences as
constituting the obligation to obey the law. The threats merely
remain as potential consequences of violating the otherwise
justified duty to obey legitimate laws. Obligation derives from

206
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the provision by Eternal Law for rational determinations of
Natural Law by human authorities. Rather than deriving an
obligation to obey from the existence of a legitimate threat of
punishment, the classical theory derives the legitimacy of a
threat of punishment from the presence of a legitimate obligation
to obey. Legal authorities can threaten consequences because
they possess legitimate authority delegated to them to create the
obligation which will later be coupled with a threat. Punishment
derives from obligation not vice-versa.
To distinguish this power to obligate from the demand of a
gunman, it is necessary to recognize that unlike the gunman’s,
the legal authority’s power is delegated from above. The legal
authority’s power originates in the power to guide toward the
development of virtue and to make determinations of Natural
Law provided by God. Since all humans share an equal human
nature—although differing in accidentals to that nature—no
person can confer authority to command on another person as
both are equal in nature. Authority must come from a superior.
Hart recognizes this need when he argues that a legal system
must have a supreme lawmaker from whom subordinated
lawmakers receive their authority.208 The indeterminacy of
Natural Law as provided for in the plan of the Eternal Law
provides for the delegation of authority from a superior. Beyond
this important distinction, the lawmaker’s command must not
only be a product of a delegated authority but it must also be a
product of reason—a deduction or determination of Natural
Law—whereas the gunman’s demand is the product solely of his
will and need not be rational. The exercise of legal authority
involves the making of rational deductions or determinations of
the rational principles of Natural Law and is thus an act not only
of the will but of the intellect. Yet, since after the Fall law serves

208
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the purpose of guiding the subjection of the disordered passions
to the intellect, it also must involve a coercive act of the will. The
absence of both intellectual and volitional elements renders a
purported act of a lawmaker nothing other than an act of
violence.209 When the necessary rational connection to Natural
Law is removed, the lawmaker becomes merely Hart’s gunman,
notwithstanding his possession of titles suggesting legitimate
authority.
CONCLUSION
Unlike Finnis’s utilitarian rationale for the existence of
human law that ought to be obeyed, traditional Natural Law
jurisprudence understands the making of particular human laws
to be a good in and of itself because the authority is fulfilling a
purpose established by the Eternal Law. Human lawmaking is
not merely instrumentally good as a useful means to coordinating
group actions. Contra Finnis, the justification of authority
defended in this Article holds that authority, the choice or
election among possible legal determinations of Natural Law
precepts, is a good in and of itself because it is legislated into the
system by the Eternal Law which provides that such
determinations ought to be made by those with care of the
community. Making human laws is thus a participation in God’s
governance of the universe which God has entrusted to Men. As
an aspect of God’s nature, authority thus is a good in its own
right and not merely an instrumental good to solve a
coordination problem. Finnis bases the need for authoritative
rulers on a requirement for “speed and certainty” that is not
provided by a coordination solution by custom.210 At his most
utilitarian, he says, “Authority (and thus the responsibility of
governing) in a community is to be exercised by those who can in
fact effectively settle co-ordination problems for that
community.”211 Particular authorities may vary widely in their
effectiveness in performing their task, but the activity has value
regardless because it is a participation in God’s law making. For
this reason, St. Thomas Aquinas held that one could not be
removed from an office of legal authority simply for making bad
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laws.212 A tyrannical prince may be participating poorly in God’s
authority but that does not detract from the goodness of that
authority itself.
Grounding human authority in the Eternal Law provides the
only answer to what Steven Smith has called law’s quandary:
Does the law exist or is it only a conceptual construct?213
Utilitarian and consent or popular sovereignty theories might
say something about law or something about why some people
obey it, but none of them provides answers to the big question. If
law and legal authority really exist, from where did they come?
As Joseph Vining has commented about Smith’s work, the
classical view of law running from the ancient world through
Christian jurisprudence maintained that the key to the big
question lay in the divine. Vining observes, “Smith begins with
an overarching sense of law, ‘classical’ or ‘traditional,’ preceding
the developments of the twentieth century. One view, which he
outlines, is that this overarching sense depended upon and
linked human law to divine law with divine judgment and
sanction.”214 The modern break with this ontology created a
metaphysical problem which the modern theories of authority fail
to solve satisfactorily. John Finnis resists relying on this
classical understanding of law and its grounding of authority and
obligation in God. He seems to believe that unless he removes
God from the explanation of authority and obligation, his
argument can be defeated by the question: “Why should we obey
God?”215 Yet, that question can be answered in the same way
that one would answer the question of a worker on a building
site: “Why should we obey the architect?” The answer is because
the architect has in his mind the entire plan and can see better
than the individual builder the purpose of his particular action
and how it fits into the overall structure. Ultimately, God should
be obeyed not simply because, in the words of Michael Moore, he
is some “Big Person.”216 As Patrick Brennan has observed, the
Thomistic definition of law does not contain an element of
coercion.217 Obedience to the law is not a result of law being
212
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coercive. Some forms of coercion may be justified once an
obligation to obey the law has been established. But this use of
coercion is a consequence of legitimate authority, not a
constituent of it. Ultimately, we should obey God’s law because
the world is objectively rational, and He is the source of that
rationality. He can see the entire architecture and thus we
should obey Him. This rational obligation to obey God’s law is
the source of the rational obligation to obey the authorities He
has permitted to participate in His lawmaking, by entrusting
them with perfecting his architectural design by making
particular determination.
Recognizing the necessity of God in the foundation of legal
authority raises the question: Should Natural Law theory be
articulated so that it depends upon belief in God? Some may fear
losing an audience for the argument over this issue. There are
two possibilities to avoid God’s fundamental role in legal
authority. Either deny his necessity or reduce that necessity to
virtually nothing. The first solution leads to the dead end
justifications of utilitarianism and consent theory. As discussed
in Part I of this Article, the attempts to justify legal authority
without God have all failed to present a cogent, complete, and
satisfactory explanation for the ontology and origin of legal
authority. For those who wish to diminish the central role of God
in the origin of law and legal authority, they likewise end up in
an unsatisfactory conclusion. Patrick Brennan vividly describes
the bleak world of legal theory built on Deist’s notions of a
minimalist God:
The world to which the Deist would consign us looks like this.
On the one hand, irrational, unfree creatures—such as puppies
and petunias—would be infallibly moved by God through their
created inclinations to their respective ends. Rational human
creatures, on the other hand, would suffer their inclinations to
their end(s), alright, but would enjoy no authoritative measure
for freely achieving them. What this would mean, in other
words, is that the creator created with the certainty that his
rational creatures would not, absent divine intervention (as in
Scripture), be commanded to the end(s) for which God created
them. Created by God but not commanded by God, to vary
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Hittinger’s phrase. Or, to vary the phrase yet again, no
measures, or rules, or law imposed by another by which to
choose and act.
Kant celebrated the putative result as
“autonomy.” But is this true?218

For this reason, Brennan argues that the very notion of law and
legal authority must be based on presuppositions about God:
And here the connection with religion, the work to make law
heard proceeds only on presuppositions. If it does not proceed
on those presuppositions, it does not produce anything to which
there is any sense of obligation. That which evokes no sense of
obligation is not law. It is only an appearance of law, the
legalistic, the authoritarian, not sovereign but an enemy.
Principal among the presuppositions of legal work are that a
person speaks through the texts; that there is mind; that mind
is caring mind. These are the links between the experience of
law and religious experience219

One need not accept everything that theology teaches about God
to find the origin of authority in Him.220 Yet, at least one must
recognize God as a God of law, a Person who orders the universe
with authority and entrusts a portion of that authority to
rational creatures to do likewise. Only here can we find not only
a satisfactory explanation of authority—an answer to the
question why the fallible determinations of other fallible rational
creatures should be obeyed as law by us—but we can also regain
a humanized authority. If law is only words and text, then as
Brennan observes, it easily becomes authoritarian. If law is in a
rational mind, it can resist authoritarianism. Locating human
legal authority within the person of God secures limits to the
exercise of that authority by human minds and the duty to obey
the laws they produce. Proving this claim is beyond the scope of
this single Article.
Finally, the Natural Law explanation satisfies Leslie Green’s
requirements for an authority that can obligate obedience to
laws. The Natural Law provides a moral reason—in the sense of
a reason independent of the human law itself—for action—
218

Id. at 1210.
Id. at 1207.
220
Note that failure to accept all that God reveals about Himself and His law
will lead to an incomplete and fractured account of Natural Law. Thus, although
acceptance of the classical Natural Law thesis does not depend on the acceptance of
all aspects of revealed theology but only natural theology, the result of failing to
integrate revealed theology will be incomplete and imperfect.
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condition (i)—because the Natural Law entrusts to human
authorities the responsibility to determine particular action to be
done or avoided pursuant to its own general precepts. Thus, the
precept of Natural Law that individuals are to live well in society
obligates us to conform to the determinations of applicable
authorities independently of those determinations themselves.
The foregoing justification of legal authority provides a contentindependent reason for action—condition (ii)—because the
general precepts of Natural Law permit for a variety of possible
conforming determinations and the particular one to be obeyed is
to be obeyed because the applicable authority in fact so
determined. Subjects do not obey human laws because all things
considered, they would have selected this particular
determination of Natural Law. They must obey because Natural
Law has delegated election of this type of determination to
human authorities.
Stephen Perry argues that to satisfy
condition (ii), we must not refer to an independent moral
obligation to do X but rather only to the legal directive to do X.221
If we parse more precisely what we mean by X, we can see how a
human law requiring citizens to do X is content independent
under the Natural Law understanding of law. For example, the
human law requiring one to drive on the right side of the road is
rooted in the obligation under Natural Law to drive safely, but
the specific obligation to do such by driving on the right side as
opposed to the left is dependent solely on the determination by a
human lawmaker even if that determination derives its
obligatory force from a more general precept of Natural Law.
Prior to the drive on the right law being enacted, each person is
free to conform to the general precept of driving safely by making
individual determinations about which side appears to be the
safest in the particular context. Yet, once the determination is
made by human law, all drivers must drive on the right because
the lawmaker has now made the determination for the
community. Punishment for murder provides another example.
The Natural Law obligates one not to murder, but the obligation
to be confined to prison for life if one murders is obligatory once a
human authority has determined a life sentence to be the
punishment due to those who commit murder. Although rooted
both in the Natural Law precepts prohibiting murder and
221
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requiring evildoers to be punished, the specific nature of the
punishment is content independent as it arises from the
legitimate determination of the authority in selecting this
particular punishment. Human law provides a binding or
mandatory reason for action—condition (iii)—because God
through Natural Law delegates the power to determine Natural
Law to human authorities. The mandatory nature of legitimate
human determinations thus derives from the mandatory nature
of the ends of human existence established in the Eternal Law.
Although the election of means in relation to that end is left to
human choice, it is not always left to each individual for all
choices. Some determinations are left to the superiors of
families, imperfect communities, and perfect communities. Yet,
the power to determine is derived from the Eternal Law. Human
law is a particular reason for action only for the directives of a
citizen’s, or subject’s, own state—condition (iv)—because Natural
Law entrusts determination not to one superior but to a variety
of temporal and spiritual superiors dispersed throughout the
variety of perfect communities around the globe. The various
imperfect and perfect communities are constituted by nature
with their own particular superiors entrusted with a specific
jurisdictional limit for making determinations for their particular
community. As argued in a prior article, those determinations
can legitimately differ from community to community and still be
derived from the same Natural Law precept.222 The developing
customs of each community will result in different but still
legitimate determinations of the same Natural Law precept.
Finally, a particular determination is a universal reason for
action—condition (v)—because it binds all of those subject to the
applicable authority to all determinations of that authority.
Unlike Raz’s theory, the classical theory requires universal
conformity even when individuals might deem the determination
unnecessary in a particular case. Many theorists have argued
that this universality condition can never be met as in every
society there will at some point be a law that should not be
obeyed.223 At some point, another normative principle demands
disobedience to a law. Such a conclusion is necessitated by
restricting the idea of legal system to human-made laws. Thus,
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when a human-made law must be disobeyed, it appears to lack
legal universality. Yet, if the legal system is larger than the
determinations by human authorities to include the Natural
Law, when those determinations that cannot be obeyed are
encountered individuals still conform their actions to the law in
its fullest sense. Subjects are only bound in conscience to obey
determinations of the Natural Law. If a human authority
commands something other than a valid determination of
Natural Law it is not a law at all. Thus, if human law is defined
to include only those acts of lawgivers that are in fact laws, the
universality condition is satisfied. Those acts of lawgivers that
may be disregarded are not laws because they are invalidated by
higher law. Yet, to prove this last point, we must examine more
carefully the limits on human law-making authority conferred by
the Natural Law. A subsequent article will argue that once this
limitation is understood, the legitimate disregarding of a human
made law can be seen not as a moral objection to a legal
obligation resulting in disobedience to law; it is a legal objection
based on the resolution of a conflict of laws and the purported
disobedience is rather an act of obedience to higher law.

